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STATE OF MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS
MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SYSTEM
MICHIGAN TAX TRIBUNAL
Ecumenical Center and International Residence,
Petitioner,
v

MTT Docket No. 16-000604

City of Ann Arbor,
Respondent.

Tribunal Judge Presiding
Preeti P. Gadola

ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION UNDER MCR 2.116(C)(10)
ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING SUMMARY DISPOSITION IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER UNDER MCR 2.116(I)(2)
FINAL OPINION AND JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
On March 3, 2017, Respondent filed a motion requesting the Tribunal enter summary
judgment in its favor in the above-captioned case under MCR 2.116 (C) (10). More specifically,
Respondent contends that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining and Petitioner
cannot demonstrate that it is a charitable institution pursuant to MCL 211.7o, entitled to a
charitable exemption from the payment of real and personal, ad valorem, property tax.
Respondent also contends Petitioner cannot demonstrate it is an educational institution pursuant
to MCL 211.7n, and as such, is not entitled to an educational exemption under the
aforementioned statute. On March 24, 2017, Petitioner filed a response to the Motion. Petitioner
contends that it can demonstrate that it is eligible for the exemptions and that it is entitled to
summary judgment under MCR 2.116(I) (2).
Petitioner, Ecumenical Center and International Residence (“ECIR”), provides privately
owned off campus housing primarily to University of Michigan International Students, but also
houses some American students. 1 Per its Petition, ECIR “is listed under Housing on the UM

1

Petitioner’s Exhibit B: Affidavit of Bruce Martin, Executive Director of ECIR, (“Affidavit”) at 5.
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International Center’s website, which describes ECIR as a ‘living-learning community for
students and visiting scholars from around the world . . . .’” 2
As noted above, in its Petition, Petitioner requested an exemption from the payment of
property tax for the 2016 tax year under MCL 211.7o and/or MCL 211.7n. Petitioner also
requested an exemption from the payment of property tax for the 2015 tax year, pursuant to
MCL 211.53b(1). The parcel numbers of the real and personal property under contention are 0909-33-202-023 and 09-90-00-064-362.
The Tribunal has reviewed the Motion, response, and the evidence submitted and finds
that partially granting Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition and partially granting
summary disposition in favor of Petitioner is warranted at this time.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS
In support of its Motion, Respondent contends that there are no genuine issues of material
fact remaining and Petitioner cannot demonstrate that it is organized chiefly for charity, that it
does not discriminate, or that its activities lessen the burden of the government.
Respondent contends that Petitioner does not meet all required factors in Wexford
Medical Group v City of Cadillac, 3 in order to qualify as a charitable institution. Respondent
specifically refers to Factors two, three and four. 4 With regard to Factor two, Respondent
contends that Petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation state that Petitioner is organized to serve
“international students” and that there is no precedent to justify this as a charitable purpose.
With regard to Factor three, Respondent contends that Petitioner only offers its services on a
discriminatory basis as the application process requires much personal information including
“nationality” and “cultural identities” and is highly subjective. In that regard, Respondent
2

See Petition, paragraph 48, filed April 21, 2016.
Wexford Medical Group v City of Cadillac, 474 Mich 192; 713 NW2d 734 (2006).
4
In Wexford the Court put forth six factors, all of which must be met, in order to qualify as nonprofit charitable
institution. The disputed factors include:
3

(2) a “charitable institution” is one that is organized chiefly, if not solely, for charity.
(3) a “charitable institution” does not offer its charity on a discriminatory basis by choosing who,
among the group it purports to serve, deserves the services. Rather, a “charitable institution”
serves any person who needs the particular type of charity being offered.
(4) a “charitable institution” brings people’s minds or hearts under the influence of education or
religion; relieves people’s bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint; assists people to establish
themselves for life; erects or maintains public buildings or works; or otherwise lessens the burdens
of government.
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contends that this case is factually similar to Telluride Ass’n Inc v Ann Arbor, 5 given the
petitioner in that case similarly housed University of Michigan students and the selection process
was “highly subjective” and was, therefore, discriminatory. Respondent also claims that Factor
four cannot be met. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Petitioner does not bring people “under
the influence of education” or “assist people to establish themselves for life” as the residents are
University of Michigan students who are already under the influence of education and are
pursuing higher education to establish themselves. Similarly, Respondent contends that
Petitioner does not bring people “under the influence of religion” as it clearly states that it does
not support or encourage any religious community. Respondent claims there is no lessening of
the burden of government because students are not required to utilize University of Michigan
housing and University housing is financially self-supporting. Overall, Respondent contends that
Petitioner does not provide any “gift” as residents only receive apartments in exchange for
market rent.
With regard to the educational exemption under MCL 211.7n, Respondent claims that
Petitioner cannot qualify as it clearly does not meet the test under Ladies Literary Club v Grand
Rapids, 6 wherein the court held that to qualify for an exemption a petitioner must “fit into the
general scheme of education provided by the state and supported by public taxation.”
Respondent again relies, in part, on Telluride, as it contends the facts in this case are
substantially similar.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS
In support of its response, Petitioner contends that there is nothing in the law to support
Respondent’s contention that a nonprofit institution for University of Michigan international
students is not charitable. Respondent merely relies upon Petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation
and Petitioner contends the Articles actually support a finding that it is organized for charity.
Petitioner cites to its IRS determination that it is charitable and quotes Wexford to support its
contention that Respondent has failed to demonstrate it is not charitable. Petitioner further
contends that it is not discriminatory as it is “open to all international students without regard to

5

Telluride Ass’n Inc v Ann Arbor, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals issued July 16, 2013
(Docket Nos. 304735 and 305239).
6
Ladies Literary Club v Grand Rapids, 409 Mich 748; 298 NW2d 422 (1980).
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church membership, race, color or creed.” 7 Petitioner claims the affidavit of Bruce Martin,
Executive Director of ECIR, supports its allegation that Petitioner is distinguishable from
Telluride in that its selection process is not highly subjective. Rather, Petitioner suggests its
selection is based on a “first come, first served” basis and that it does not rank the applicants in
any way. With regard to bringing individual’s hearts and minds under the influence of education
or religion, Petitioner contends that Respondent has, again, failed to demonstrate any fact to
support that this factor is not met. Merely because a student is attending the University of
Michigan, does not mean the individual cannot have their heart or mind brought under the
influence of education or religion by Petitioner. Petitioner further claims the Affidavit
establishes that Petitioner assists its residents in establishing themselves for life as illustrated by
the experiences of former residents.
Finally, Petitioner alleges it qualifies as an educational institution under the statute and
that its programing fits into the general scheme of education provided by the University of
Michigan. It further distinguishes itself from the petitioner in Telluride stating that its
educational programing is much more expansive than the “two summer programs offered for
high school juniors and sophomores . . . .” 8
STANDARD OF REVIEW
There is no specific Tribunal rule governing motions for summary disposition. Therefore,
the Tribunal is bound to follow the Michigan Rules of Court in rendering a decision on such
motions. 9 In this case, Respondent moves for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
asserting that no genuine issues of material fact remain. The Tribunal also finds it appropriate to
address MCR 2.116(I)(2) in this case.
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim and
must identify those issues regarding which the moving party asserts there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Under subsection (C)(10), a motion for summary disposition will be granted if the
documentary evidence demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 10 In the event, however, it is determined

7

Petitioner’s Brief in Opposition to City of Ann Arbor’s Motion for Summary Disposition (“Response Brief”) at 14.
Id. at 19.
9
See TTR 215.
10
See Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454-455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).
8
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that an asserted claim can be supported by evidence at trial, a motion under (C)(10) will be
denied. 11
The Michigan Supreme Court has established that a court must consider affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed by the parties in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. 12 The moving party bears the initial burden of
supporting its position by presenting its documentary evidence for the court to consider. 13 The
burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. 14
Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a non-moving party, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings but must go beyond the
pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. 15 If the
opposing party fails to present documentary evidence establishing the existence of a material
factual dispute, the motion is properly granted. 16
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) is appropriate “[i]f it appears to the court
that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment . . . ,” and as such,
the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing party. 17
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Tribunal has carefully considered Respondent’s Motion under MCR 2.116 (C)(10)
and finds that partially granting the Motion is warranted. In addition, the Tribunal also finds that
partially granting summary disposition in favor of Petitioner under MCR 2.116(I)(2) is
warranted.
The Tribunal shall first address Respondent’s contention that its references to MCL
211.7o(1) and MCL 211.7n also include MCL 211.9(1)(a). Petitioner, at no time, referenced or
requested an exemption under MCL 211.9(1)(a). Further, as recently determined by the
Michigan Supreme Court in SBC Health Midwest, Inc v City of Kentwood, 18 the requirements to

11

See Arbelius v Poletti, 188 Mich App 14; 469 NW2d 436 (1991).
See Quinto v Cross and Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996) (citing MCR 2.116(G)(5)).
13
See Neubacher v Globe Furniture Rentals, Inc, 205 Mich App 418, 420; 522 NW2d 335 (1994).
14
Id.
15
See McCart v J Walter Thompson USA, Inc, 437 Mich 109, 115; 469 NW2d 284 (1991).
16
See McCormic v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 202 Mich App 233, 237; 507 NW2d 741 (1993).
17
See also Washburn v Michailoff, 240 Mich App 669; 613 NW2d 405 (2000).
18
SBC Health Midwest, Inc v City of Kentwood, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2017).
12
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qualify for an exemption under MCL 211.9(1)(a) differ from those under MCL 211.7n. 19 As the
issue of an exemption under MCL 211.9(1)(a) was not properly raised or requested by Petitioner,
it is not pending in this appeal. Therefore, the Tribunal will not address the merits of a claim for
exemption under MCL 211.9(1)(a).
A. Charitable Institution Exemption under MCL 211.7o
The exemption for real and personal property owned and occupied by a nonprofit
charitable institution is found in MCL 211.7o (1) which reads, in pertinent part: “[r]eal or
personal property owned and occupied by a nonprofit charitable institution while occupied by
that nonprofit charitable institution solely for the purposes for which it was incorporated is
exempt from the collection of taxes under this act.”
In Wexford, the Supreme Court changed the test for a charitable exemption previously
affirmed in Ladies Liberty Club. The Court restated the test in three parts:
(1) The real estate must be owned and occupied by the exemption claimant;
(2) The exemption claimant must be a nonprofit charitable institution; and
(3) The exemption exists only when the building and other property thereon are occupied
by the claimant solely for the purpose for which it was incorporated.
The meaning of “charitable institution” is not legislatively defined, and as such, has been
developed in case law. In Retirement Homes v Sylvan Twp, 20 the Michigan Supreme Court set
forth the following definition of “charity:”
[A] gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the
influence of education or religion, by relieving the bodies from disease, suffering
or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of the
government. 21
Further, the proper focus in determining an individual organization’s eligibility for a
charitable institution exemption is whether the organization’s “activities, taken as a whole,
constitute a charitable gift for the benefit of the general public without restriction or for the

19

The Court held, It may also follow that the standard is also different from MCL 211.7o; however, the Tribunal
declines to fully address this issue as Petitioner has not requested an exemption under MCL 211.9(1)(a).
20
Retirement Homes v Sylvan Twp, 416 Mich 340; 330 NW2d 682 (1982).
21
Id. at 348-349 (emphasis in original).
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benefit of an indefinite number of persons.” 22 Wexford reaffirmed the “widely used definition” of
“charity”:
[Charity] * * * [is] a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the
benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts
under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from
disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life,
or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the
burdens of government.” 23
Wexford also identified six factors relevant to the determination of whether an organization
meets the definition of “charity” that was first set forth in Retirement Homes:
In light of this definition, certain factors come into play when determining
whether an institution is a "charitable institution" under MCL 211.7o. Among
them are the following:
(1) A "charitable institution" must be a nonprofit institution.
(2) A "charitable institution" is one that is organized chiefly, if not solely, for
charity.
(3) A "charitable institution" does not offer its charity on a discriminatory basis
by choosing who, among the group it purports to serve, deserves the services.
Rather, a "charitable institution" serves any person who needs the particular type
of charity being offered.
(4) A "charitable institution" brings people's minds or hearts under the influence
of education or religion; relieves people's bodies from disease, suffering, or
constraint; assists people to establish themselves for life; erects or maintains
public buildings or works; or otherwise lessens the burdens of government.
(5) A "charitable institution" can charge for its services as long as the charges are
not more than what is needed for its successful maintenance.
(6) A "charitable institution" need not meet any monetary threshold of charity to
merit the charitable institution exemption; rather, if the overall nature of the
institution is charitable, it is a "charitable institution" regardless of how much
money it devotes to charitable activities in a particular year. 24
In its Motion, Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner owns and occupies the subject
property. Further, Respondent does not dispute that the property is occupied solely for the
purpose for which it was incorporated. Rather, Respondent only disputes that Petitioner cannot
demonstrate that it meets all factors under Wexford. The specifically disputed Factors are two,

22

Michigan United Conservation Clubs v Lansing Twp (“MUCC”), 423 Mich 661, 673; 378 NW2d 737 (1985).
Wexford, 474 Mich at 211 (citation omitted).
24
Wexford, 474 Mich at 215.
23
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three, and four. Thus, the Tribunal finds there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute
with regard to the ownership and occupancy, that the property is occupied solely for the purposes
for which it was incorporated, and with regard to Wexford Factors one, five, and six. The
remaining three factors enumerated by Wexford must be applied along with the recognized
statutory definition of charity, on a case-by-case basis, with special attention paid to case law
involving similar facts. In applying the relevant factors to the subject property, the Tribunal
individually addresses these remaining factors as follows.
(2) A "charitable institution" is one that is organized chiefly, if not solely, for charity.
With regard to Factor two, Respondent contends that Petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation
clearly indicate that Petitioner is not organized chiefly for charity. Specifically, the Articles of
Incorporation state that the purpose for which it is formed is “to formulate and execute the
policies of a program for the spiritual, social, and personal welfare of the international students
enrolled at the University of Michigan . . . .” 25 Respondent concludes that “an entity organized
primarily to serve ‘international students’ is ‘organized chiefly, if not solely, for charity.’ ” 26
Petitioner contends that Respondent’s assertion is not supported and that its Articles do, in fact,
support the conclusion that Petitioner is organized for educational and religious purposes which
is charitable in nature. The Tribunal finds that Respondent has failed to support its allegation
that “international students” cannot be a group that can be serviced by a charitable organization.
Moreover, “[w]hile the articles bear relevance to whether the use of the property qualifies as
charitable, they are not definitive.” 27 Thus, the Tribunal finds that limiting the evaluation of this
factor to Petitioner’s Articles would be an error. Here, Petitioner also points to its IRS
determination that Petitioner is “organized and operated exclusively for religious and charitable
purposes.” 28 Again, the fact that Petitioner is exempt as a 501(c)(3) does not definitively
determine that Petitioner is organized chiefly for charitable purposes. The Michigan standard for
exemption is more rigorous than the federal standard and the mere fact that Petitioner qualifies

25

Respondent’s Exhibit 1: Petitioner’s Non-Profit Articles of Incorporation at 1.
Respondent’s Brief in Support at 11.
27
Camp Retreats Found, Inc v Twp of Marathon, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued May 15, 2012, (Docket No. 304179) (citing Michigan Baptist Homes v City of Ann Arbor, 396 Mich
660; 242 NW2d 749 (1976), wherein the court looked beyond the articles of incorporation).
28
Petitioner’s Exhibit A.
26

MTT Docket No. 16-000604
Final Opinion and Judgment, Page 9 of 22
for tax exempt status under Federal law creates no presumption in favor of an exemption from
property taxes. 29 The Tribunal, nonetheless finds that this is one factor to be considered.
Petitioner also cites to its Mission Statement which states:
The mission of ECIR is to be a welcoming community for students/scholars of all
nationalities; to provide residential and education programs fostering
understanding and respect for all cultures and spiritual traditions; to promote
lifelong friendships and leadership skills that contribute to harmony and peace
between communities and nations around the world.
The Tribunal finds that Petitioner’s purpose set forth in its Articles of Incorporation and its
Mission Statement are consistent with definition of “charity” as set forth above. In addition to
these statements, Petitioner has provided evidence of its numerous charitable events and
activities. The Court in Wexford stated “Petitioner is not only organized as a charitable
institution as reflected in its statement of purpose and its bylaws, but it devotes itself to
charitable works on the whole.” 30 Here, Petitioner is similar in that when looking at the
organization as a whole, its overall nature and primary organizational purpose is charitable.
Respondent’s primary contention is that Petitioner cannot cite to precedent wherein
“international students” are an appropriate demographic for charitable works. Conversely,
Respondent has also failed to cite any precedent stating that “international students” cannot be a
demographic for charitable works. This contention appears to relate more to Factor three,
however, the Tribunal notes that Wexford clearly indicates that “a charitable institution can exist
to serve a particular group or type of person . . . .” 31 Viewed in the light most favorable to
Petitioner, the nonmoving party, the Tribunal finds that Respondent has not demonstrated that an
organization to serve international students cannot be charitable. The Court in Harmony
Montessori Center v City of Oak Park, 32 held that “[t]he consideration discussed in context in
Wexford was whether the charity’s services—whatever they might be—were available to anyone,
in the context ‘of the type and scope of charity it offers.’ ” Similarly, the Court in Wexford stated

29

See Ladies Literary Club v Grand Rapids, 409 Mich 748, 753 n 1; 298 NW2d 422 (1980); see also American
Concrete Institute v State Tax Comm, 12 Mich App 595, 606; 163 NW2d 508 (1968), which states, “[t]he Institute's
exemption from Michigan ad valorem tax is not determinable by its qualification as an organization exempt from
income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the internal revenue code of 1954, but by the much more strict provisions of
the Michigan general property tax act . . . .”
30
Wexford, 474 Mich at 215-16.
31
Wexford, 474 Mich at 213.
32
Harmony Montessori Center v City of Oak Park, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
February 18, 2014 (Docket No. 312856) (quoting Wexford, 474 Mich at 213).
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that “Respondent has pointed to no other reason for petitioner's existence. Nor has respondent
shown any evidence that petitioner is not actively pursuing its mission to the exclusion of any
noncharitable activities. We find these omissions telling.” 33 Here, Respondent merely asserts
that Petitioner cannot demonstrate that it is charitable without indicating another reason for
Petitioner’s existence or evidence that Petitioner is not pursuing its charitable mission.
Respondent relies upon the unpublished case of Telluride regarding the remaining two
factors. However, the Tribunal finds this case is also relevant to Factor two. The petitioner in
that case was similar to Petitioner, here, whereby it was a scholarship house which housed
University of Michigan students. In that case, the Tribunal examined the petitioner’s Certificate
of Incorporation, testimony interpreting the same, petitioner’s By-Laws, petitioner’s Charter, and
activities. Overall, the Tribunal held that the petitioner had a community service oriented
purpose and “to assist the member in developing his or her potential for leadership and public
service.” 34 The Tribunal continued in that the petitioner offered numerous “gifts” but that given
only its residents received the primary gift (i.e., the opportunity to live at the property at no cost
to the student), it was not “indefinite” and not sufficient to demonstrate a charitable nature. On
appeal, however, the Court held that “[w]e agree with Telluride that the tribunal erred to the
extent it concluded that Telluride is not organized chiefly, if not solely, for charity.” 35 While the
Court did not detail its reasoning for its disagreement, the Tribunal finds it is nonetheless telling.
More specifically, the petitioner in Telluride similarly offered its “charity” to only University of
Michigan students which qualified academically to become a member of the “self-governing
scholarship house.” This is similar to Petitioner who offers its charity to University of Michigan
international students. Moreover, the language utilized in Telluride’s Certificate of
Incorporation is not fundamentally distinguishable from the language in Petitioner’s Articles of
Incorporation.
The Tribunal also finds that Petitioner does, in fact, offer a “gift” to its residents. The
undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that Petitioner offers its rooms for rent at below market
rates, it offers fully furnished apartments, and provides its residents with meals and a library with
books and multi-media access. 36 In some instances, Petitioner even offers reduced or subsidized
33

Wexford, 474 Mich at 216.
Telluride Ass’n v City of Ann Arbor, 20 MTT 291 (Docket No. 306817), issued May 24, 2011 at 303.
35
Telluride, unpub op at 4.
36
Affidavit at 5.
34
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rental rates wherein the difference is made up through donations. 37 The following passage from
Wexford is on point:
Petitioner is also fundamentally different from the Hillside Terrace home for the
aged in Michigan Baptist, supra, and the apartment complex in Retirement
Homes, supra. In both of those cases, the cost of maintaining the institutions was
covered by fees collected from the residents. Prospective residents whose health
or financial status did not meet strict requirements were not accepted. And
although the petitioner in Michigan Baptist made some small exceptions in that
regard, the general rule was of an exclusionary nature, not a charitable one. 38
The facts in this case demonstrate that if an applicant cannot afford the rent, Petitioner provides
assistance in obtaining funding to allow that individual to receive its charity. This is
distinguishable from cases in which residents were turned away based upon their financial status.
Petitioner further offers numerous educational opportunities as well as community
service opportunities. 39 The Court in Retirement Homes held that the apartments were not
exempt and that residents did not “receive any significant benefit that they do not pay for” and
therefore, there is no “gift to the residents.” The Wexford opinion cited from Retirement Homes
as follows:
[T]here is no “gift” for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons or for the
benefit of the general public without restriction in the operation of the apartments.
The monthly fee is designed to cover all operating costs as well as to recover the
construction costs of the apartments. While it does not appear that the apartments
are operated for a profit, neither does it appear that the residents receive any
significant benefit that they do not pay for. There is no “gift” to the residents.
The operation of the apartments does not appear to benefit the general public. Its
residents are chosen on the basis of their good health, their ability to pay the
monthly charge, and, generally, their ability to live independently. 40
Again, these facts are distinguishable from the facts of this case. More specifically, Petitioner’s
residents receive gifts beyond below market rent or subsidized rent. The evidence on record
demonstrates that Petitioner provides community meals and events for its residents as well as
provides numerous educational opportunities. Thus, the Tribunal finds that when viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Petitioner, Petitioner is organized chiefly for charitable
purposes.
37

Affidavit at 6.
Wexford, 474 Mich at 216.
39
See Affidavit, attachments.
40
Wexford, 474 Mich at 211 (quoting Retirement Homes, 416 Mich at 349-50).
38
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(3) A "charitable institution" does not offer its charity on a discriminatory basis by choosing
who, among the group it purports to serve, deserves the services. Rather, a "charitable
institution" serves any person who needs the particular type of charity being offered.
With regard to Factor three, the Tribunal finds that Respondent contends that Petitioner
offers its charity on a discriminatory basis because its application and selection processes are
discriminatory in that Petitioner’s website FAQs indicate that candidates are selected “based on
their potential contribution to the community” and that the selection process is highly subjective.
Respondent correlates this process to that in the Telluride case, wherein, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Tribunal’s determination that Telluride’s charity was offered on a discriminatory
basis. Petitioner contends that its “residential program is open to all international students
without regard to church membership, race, color or creed.” 41 Petitioner also contends that this
case is distinguishable from Telluride as its positions are filled on a “first come, first served”
basis and the applicants are not ranked in any way.
The Tribunal finds that Petitioner first set forth its contention that its residents were
selected on a first come, first served basis in its Petition.42 Mr. Martin’s affidavit sets forth the
following regarding the selection process:
We accept inquiries and applications throughout the year, and we accept
applications in the order they come in, the primary factor being the availability of
beds in our apartments. Over the course of my eight years at ECIR, and the
hundreds of applications and residents we have had, I know that ECIR has never
“graded” or “ranked” our applications, and we do not take any steps to select who
among our applicants “deserves” to be a resident. The questions on our
application are helpful in determining which apartment the resident will stay, and
in integrating residents into our program once they are living here. The only limit
on a person wishing to be a part of our residential program is space available at
the time of the application. Our residential program is first come, first served.
This fact is not disputed by Respondent by anything other than Respondent’s reference to
Petitioner’s website. The website indicates that applications are reviewed and, among other
things, candidates are selected based on availability. This portion is wholly consistent with Mr.
Martin’s affidavit. The website further states that applications are reviewed for “potential
contribution to the community” and candidates “interests.” This again is not inconsistent with
Mr. Martin’s affidavit wherein he states that the application responses assist in determining the
41
42

Petitioner’s Response at 14.
Petition at 5.
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appropriate apartment for the candidates. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that there is no disputed
fact, on record, that Petitioner’s selection process is done on the basis of first come, first serve.
Contrary to Respondent’s assertions, this is similar to Wexford and does not demonstrate that its
charity is discriminatory.
Respondent also parallels this case to Telluride. In Telluride, the Court of Appeals held
that:
Telluride does discriminate by choosing who, among these groups, will receive its
charity. Telluride selects scholarship recipients through a highly subjective
application process. Candidates submit essays that are read by Telluride House
members. “Each candidate receives an overall ranking based on the strength of
the essays, awards, references, and community service, among other factors.”
Telluride House members then conduct interviews and choose to whom it will
offer scholarships. Telluride selects its TASP and TASS participants on the basis
of a similar application process. 43
This is factually distinguishable from the case at hand. It is undisputed that Petitioner does not
rank its applicants based on their answers, or references, unlike the petitioner in Telluride.
Therefore, based on the undisputed facts the Tribunal finds that Petitioner’s selection process is
distinguishable from Telluride and is not a highly subjective process. There is no genuine issue
of fact remaining that Petitioner does not offer its charity on a discriminatory basis.
On June 28, 2017, the Michigan Supreme Court clarified factor three of Wexford, and as
applied to this matter, affirms Petitioner’s contention that its charity is not applied on a
discriminatory basis. In Baruch SLS, Inc v Tittabawassee Twp 44 Petitioner appealed the
Tribunal’s determination, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that it did not qualify as a
charitable institution within the meaning of MCL 211.7o and MCL 211.9 because it offered its
charity on a discriminatory basis. Petitioner was an adult foster care facility that offered an
income-based subsidy to qualifying residents of Stone Crest Assisted Living, provided those
residents made at least 24 full monthly payments to petitioner. 45 The Tribunal found Petitioner
was not a charitable institution under three of the six Wexford factors and the Court of Appeals
found Petitioner was not a charitable institution under Factor three because, by limiting the
availability of the income based subsidy, petitioner offered its services on a discriminatory basis.

43

Telluride, unpub op at 4.
Baruch SLS, Inc v Titabawassee Twp, ____Mich ____; ____NW2d___ (2017) (Docket No. 152047)
45
Id at 3.
44
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The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal and the Court of Appeals decided this issue on
the basis of an incorrect understanding of the third factor in the Wexford test and remanded to the
Tribunal for proceedings consistent with its opinion. Noting that it has been interpreted
incorrectly, by the lower courts, as excluding from the definition of charitable institution
organizations that charge fees for their services, don’t operate at a loss, or select their
beneficiaries using any non-random criteria, the Court clarified that Factor three excludes only
restrictions or conditions that bear no reasonable relationship to a permissible charitable goal.
Specifically mentioning Telluride, the Court found beneficiaries have to be selected in some
manner, as most organizations cannot serve everyone. 46 Further, the “reasonable relationship”
test is to be construed broadly: “In short, the relationship between the institutions restriction and
its charitable goal need not be the most direct or obvious. Any reasonable restriction that is
implemented to further a charitable goal that passes factor four is acceptable.” 47 The Court
acknowledged the deferential nature of this test, but found it warranted, absent any indication in
the statute as to the restrictions a charity may or may not place on its services.

The Tribunal

finds in this matter that Petitioner’s insignificant selection criteria, or restrictions or conditions,
bear a reasonable relationship to its permissible charitable goal, as put forth in the discussion of
Wexford factor 4, below. 48

(4) A "charitable institution" brings people's minds or hearts under the influence of
education or religion; relieves people's bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint;
assists people to establish themselves for life; erects or maintains public buildings or
works; or otherwise lessens the burdens of government.
Respondent contends that Petitioner cannot bring its residents’ hearts and minds under
the influence of education because all residents are University of Michigan students who have
already brought their minds under the influence of education. Respondent has, however, failed
to cite any authority that indicates that a collegiate student cannot be further brought under the
influence of education. The Tribunal is unconvinced that merely because the residents are
already pursuing education that their minds cannot be further brought under the influence of
education. Mr. Martin’s affidavit indicates that Petitioner:

46

Id at 9.
Id at 13.
48
Id at 11.
47
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Offers extensive and year round educational programs for [their] residents, the
entire international student community at the University of Michigan, and the
public at large, in collaboration and co-sponsorship with the UM International
Center and other UM departments and programs. This educational programing is
designed to help international students learn about their different cultures and
religious and spiritual traditions, and to succeed and thrive in the multicultural
community of the UM, Ann Arbor, and Michigan.
Further, the attachments to the Affidavit demonstrate numerous programs offered by Petitioner
including speakers, presentations on cultural music and food, as well as religion and spiritual
matters. The Tribunal finds that there is nothing in the record to dispute that these activities
brought the residents’ minds under the influence of education. Both parties rely upon the ruling
in Kalamazoo Aviation History Museum v City of Kalamazoo, 49 in which the Court held that
“where a nonprofit institution educates the public so as to enhance its understanding of a
worthwhile subject the institution can qualify as a tax-exempt charitable organization . . . .” 50
The Tribunal finds that it cannot make the determination that the cultural educational
opportunities offered by Petitioner is not part of a “worthwhile subject.” Moreover, the
Kalamazoo Aviation Court went on further to state:
If a nature center which seeks to impart a better understanding of natural resource
management qualifies for a charitable exemption, or if a conservation club would
qualify as a tax-exempt charity but for its political activities, we see no reason
why tax-exempt status should not be accorded to a museum which preserves and
informs the public about part of our history. 51
The Tribunal similarly concludes that there is no reason to find that Petitioner’s educational
programing do not bring its residents under the influence of education.
Respondent also contends that Petitioner does not bring its residents hearts and minds
under the influence of religion because it is an interreligious community and it states that it does
not support or encourage any specific religion. Respondent again does not provide any support
for this contention and there is no indication that an organization must sponsor a single religious
faith to bring individuals hearts and minds under the influence of religion. Like the above,
Petitioner has submitted documentation demonstrating that it sponsored activities such as
presentations on specific religions, faiths, and spiritual events. These activities could, in fact,

49

Kalamazoo Aviation History Museum v City of Kalamazoo, 131 Mich App 709; 346 NW2d 862 (1984).
Kalamazoo Aviation, 131 Mich App at 717.
51
Kalamazoo Aviation, 131 Mich App at 717-18.
50
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bring individuals under the influence of religion. At a minimum, these presentations present
additional educational opportunities.
Respondent further contends that Petitioner cannot demonstrate that it assists people to
establish themselves for life. In this regard, Respondent erroneously and without support states
that all the residents receive is an apartment in exchange for market rent. However, as
specifically discussed above the undisputed facts show that Petitioner provides below market
rent and subsidized rent to its residents. It further provides additional programing including
community dinners and presentations, at no additional cost. Respondent has failed to dispute the
fact that Petitioner offers cultural experiences and educational opportunities which may assist
international students to establish themselves for life. Mr. Martin’s affidavit specifically states
that programing “provides not only an orientation to US culture but an opportunity to develop
skills in conversational English, both very important to the success of UM international students
new to the US.” 52
Respondent finally contends that Petitioner does not otherwise lessen the burden of the
government. As stated in Wexford:
While “lessening the burden of government” is a component of the definition of
“charity” found in Retirement Homes, supra, respondent takes it out of context.
This Court stated that a charitable institution is one that benefits an indefinite
number of persons “‘either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence
of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or
constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves for life, or by erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of
government.’ ” Id. (emphasis added; citation omitted). Implicit in the definition is
that relieving bodies from disease or suffering is lessening the burden of
government. In other words, petitioner does not have to prove that its actions
lessen the burden of government. Rather, it has to prove, as it did, that it
“reliev[es] their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint,” which is, by its
nature, a lessening of the burden of government. 53
Here, as fully discussed above, at a minimum Petitioner brings its residents’ hearts and minds
under the influence of education which is lessening the burden of government.
B. Educational Exemption under MCL 211.7n

52
53

Affidavit at 10.
Wexford, 474 Mich at 219.
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In addition to the charitable exemption, Petitioner also claims that it is entitled to an
exemption under MCL 211.7n which provides:
Real estate or personal property owned and occupied by nonprofit . . .
educational . . . institutions incorporated under the laws of this state with the
buildings and other property thereon while occupied by them solely for the
purposes for which the institutions were incorporated is exempt from taxation
under this act.
In order to qualify for an exemption as an educational institution under MCL 211.7n, Petitioner
must meet three criteria:
(1)
(2)
(3)

The real estate must be owned and occupied by the exemption claimant;
The exemption claimant must be a nonprofit educational institution, and
The exemption exists only when the buildings and other property thereon are
occupied by the claimant solely for the purposes for which it was incorporated. 54

The Court in Ladies Literary Club, specified two requirements that must be met in order
for an organization to qualify for an educational exemption from taxation:
1. An institution seeking an educational exemption must fit into the general
scheme of education provided by the state and supported by public taxation.
2. The institution must contribute substantially to the relief of the educational
burden of government. 55
This standard is substantially different from the standard for a charitable exemption as discussed
above. While the line of cases above entitle organizations for charitable exemptions, their
educational purposes do not fit into the general scheme of education by the state thereby also
entitling them to an educational exemption. Similarly, while the Tribunal has found that
Petitioner’s activities bring its residents’ minds under the influence of education, it is not also
entitled to an educational exemption as discussed below.
Respondent again relies upon the Court’s ruling in Telluride. Specifically, the Court
stated:

54

Grosse Pointe Academy v Township of Grosse Pointe, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
decided November 2, 2004 (Docket No. 248340), citing Engineering Society of Detroit v Detroit, 308 Mich 539,
550; 14 NW2d 79 (1944). The Tribunal notes that the requirement that the claimant be incorporated under Michigan
law is no longer valid, having been found to be unconstitutional as it denied equal protection to institutions
registered out-of-state. OCLC Online Computer Library Center, Inc v City of Battle Creek, 224 Mich App 608, 612;
569 NW2d 676 (1997), citing Chauncey & Marion Deering McCormick Foundation v Wawatam Twp, 186 Mich
App 511, 515; 465 NW2d 14 (1990).
55
Ladies Literary Club, 409 Mich at 755-76.
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There is no evidence that, if not for Telluride, the burden on the state would be
proportionately increased. Ladies Literary Club, 409 Mich. at 755–756. The state
and the University of Michigan have no obligation to house students, and the
university does not require its students to live on campus. Further, the university's
housing system is designed to be self-sustaining and is expected to generate all of
its own revenue. It receives no general fund or State of Michigan allocations.
Further Telluride's educational programs are not the type of programs
traditionally offered by or through the state. Therefore, we hold that the tribunal
correctly denied Telluride's claim for an educational institution exemption.56
Although Petitioner has demonstrated that it provides more educational opportunities than the
petitioner in Telluride, it has failed to demonstrate that the educational programing it provides
would lessen any burden on the state. Like Telluride, the programs bestow a benefit but there is
no indication that if not for Petitioner’s programs “the burden on the state would be
proportionally increased.” 57 Thus, the Tribunal finds that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that
there are genuine issues of fact remaining regarding its entitlement to an educational exemption
under MCL 211.7n.
C. Exemption of the Property for the 2015 tax year under MCL 211.53b(1)
In its Petition, filed April 21, 2016, Petitioner has requested an exemption from the payment
of property tax for the subject property under MCL 211.7o and/or MCL 211.7n for the 2015 tax
year, pursuant to MCL 211.53(b)(1) which states,
If there has been a qualified error, the qualified error shall be verified by
the local assessing officer and approved by the board of review. Except as
otherwise provided in subsection (9), the board of review shall meet for
the purposes of this section on Tuesday following the second Monday in
December and on Tuesday following the third Monday in July. If
approved, the board of review shall file an affidavit within 30 days relative
to the qualified error with the proper officials and all affected official
records shall be corrected. If the qualified error results in an overpayment
or underpayment, the rebate, including any interest paid, shall be made to
the taxpayer or the taxpayer shall be notified and payment made within 30
days of the notice. A rebate shall be without interest. The treasurer in
possession of the appropriate tax roll may deduct the rebate from the
appropriate tax collecting unit's subsequent distribution of taxes. The
treasurer in possession of the appropriate tax roll shall bill to the
appropriate tax collecting unit the tax collecting unit's share of taxes
rebated. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (6) and (8) and
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Telluride, unpub op at 6.
Telluride, unpub op at 6 (citing Ladies Literary Club).
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section 27a (4), a correction under this subsection may be made for the
current year and the immediately preceding year only.
MCL 211.53b (10) defines qualified error to include:
As used in this section, "qualified error" means 1 or more of the
following:
(a) A clerical error relative to the correct assessment figures, the rate of
taxation, or the mathematical computation relating to the assessing of
taxes.
(b) A mutual mistake of fact.
(c) An adjustment under section 27a (4) or an exemption under section
7hh (3) (b).
(d) An error of measurement or calculation of the physical dimensions or
components of the real property being assessed.
(e) An error of omission or inclusion of a part of the real property being
assessed.
(f) An error regarding the correct taxable status of the real property being
assessed.
(g) An error made by the taxpayer in preparing the statement of
assessable personal property under section 19. [Emphasis added].
(h) An error made in the denial of a claim of exemption for personal
property under section 9o.
There is no indication in the Petition, Answer, Motion or Response regarding what the
qualified error for the 2015 tax year was, pursuant to MCL 211.53b (10). 58 Further, there is no
supporting information in the Petition, Answer, Motion, or Response regarding the taxable
status of the property in 2015, there is no indication that an application for exemption was
submitted for the 2015 tax year or that there was a denial by the Board of Review. Further
there is no allegation that Respondent’s assessor had previous notice or knowledge as to

58

The Tribunal opines the alleged error may be pursuant to MCL 211.53b (10) (f), but no specific section of the
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whether the subject property qualified as exempt, prior to issuing the 2015 assessment. As
such, the Tribunal does not find the aforementioned statute applicable.
Conclusion
Given the above, the Tribunal finds that Respondent’s Motion with regard to an
exemption under MCL 211.7o is denied and summary disposition in favor of Petitioner on this
issue is appropriate. However, under MCL 211.7n, Respondent’s Motion shall be partially
granted. Overall, the Tribunal finds there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining in this
case. As such, the Tribunal finds the subject real and personal property to be exempt from the
payment of property tax for the 2016 tax year, pursuant to MCL 211.7o, and closes the case.
JUDGMENT
IT IS ORDERED that Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Summary Disposition is PARTIALLY GRANTED in
favor of Petitioner under MCR 2.116(I)(2) and the property is exempt from the payment of
property tax for the 2016 tax year.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the officer charged with maintaining the assessment
rolls for the tax years at issue shall correct or cause the assessment rolls to be corrected to reflect
the property’s true cash and taxable values as finally provided in this Final Opinion and
Judgment within 20 days of the entry of the Final Opinion and Judgment, subject to the
processes of equalization. 59 To the extent that the final level of assessment for a given year has
not yet been determined and published, the assessment rolls shall be corrected once the final
level is published or becomes known.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the officer charged with collecting or refunding the
affected taxes shall collect taxes and any applicable interest or issue a refund within 28 days of
entry of this Final Opinion and Judgment. If a refund is warranted, it shall include a
proportionate share of any property tax administration fees paid and penalty and interest paid on
delinquent taxes. The refund shall also separately indicate the amount of the taxes, fees,
penalties, and interest being refunded. A sum determined by the Tribunal to have been
59

See MCL 205.755.

MTT Docket No. 16-000604
Final Opinion and Judgment, Page 21 of 22
unlawfully paid shall bear interest from the date of payment to the date of judgment, and the
judgment shall bear interest to the date of its payment. A sum determined by the Tribunal to have
been underpaid shall not bear interest for any time period prior to 28 days after the issuance of
this Final Opinion and Judgment. Pursuant to MCL 205.737, interest shall accrue (i) after
December 31, 2009, at the rate of 1.23% for calendar year 2010, (ii) after December 31, 2010, at
the rate of 1.12% for calendar year 2011, (iii) after December 31, 2011, through June 30, 2012,
at the rate of 1.09%, (iv) after June 30, 2012, through June 30, 2016, at the rate of 4.25%, (v)
after June 30, 2016, through December 31, 2016, at the rate of 4.40%, and (vi) after December
31, 2016, through June 30, 2017, at the rate of 4.50%, and (vii) after June 30, 2017, through
December 31, 2017, at the rate of 4.70%.
This Final Opinion and Judgment resolves the last pending claim and closes the case.

APPEAL RIGHTS
If you disagree with the final decision in this case, you may file a motion for reconsideration
with the Tribunal or a claim of appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals.

A Motion for reconsideration must be filed with the required filing fee within 21 days from the
date of entry of the final decision. 60 Because the final decision closes the case, the motion
cannot be filed through the Tribunal’s web-based e-filing system; it must be filed by mail or
personal service. The fee for the filing of such motions is $50.00 in the Entire Tribunal and
$25.00 in the Small Claims Division, unless the Small Claims decision relates to the valuation of
property and the property had a principal residence exemption of at least 50% at the time the
petition was filed or the decision relates to the grant or denial of a poverty exemption and, if so,
there is no filing fee. 61 A copy of the motion must be served on the opposing party by mail or
personal service or by email if the opposing party agrees to electronic service, and proof
demonstrating that service must be submitted with the motion. 62 Responses to motions for
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See TTR 261 and 257.
See TTR 217 and 267.
62
See TTR 261 and 225.
61
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reconsideration are prohibited and there are no oral arguments unless otherwise ordered by the
Tribunal. 63

A claim of appeal must be filed with the appropriate filing fee. If the claim is filed within 21
days of the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal by right.” If the claim is filed more than
21 days after the entry of the final decision, it is an “appeal by leave.” 64 A copy of the claim
must be filed with the Tribunal with the filing fee required for certification of the record on
appeal. 65 The fee for certification is $100.00 in both the Entire Tribunal and the Small Claims
Division, unless no Small Claims fee is required. 66
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